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That is true for humans, but it is equally true for animals, who
must survive real-world challenges in environments in which
errors lead to extinction. Brain evolution is not separate from
the ability to observe and know the real world. On the contrary,
when we are given truthful feedback about the world, humans
and other animals become quite reality-based. There is no con-
tradiction between constructivism and realism.
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Abstract: Carruthers argues that an integrated faculty of
metarepresentation evolved for mindreading and was later exapted for
metacognition. A more consistent application of his approach would
regard metarepresentation in mindreading with the same skeptical
rigor, concluding that the “faculty” may have been entirely exapted.
Given this result, the usefulness of Carruthers’ line-drawing exercise is
called into question.
Carruthers’ recent work on metacognition in the target article
(and in Carruthers 2008b) can be seen as an extended exercise
in “debunking” metarepresentational interpretations of the
results of experiments performed on nonhuman animals. The
debunking approach operates by distinguishing “weak” metacog-
nition, which depends only on first-order mechanisms, from
“genuine” metacognition, which deploys metarepresentations.
Shaun Gallagher (2001; 2004; with similar proposals explored
by Hutto 2004; 2008) has been on a similar debunking mission
with respect to metarepresentation in human mindreading abil-
ities. Gallagher’s position stands in an area of conceptual space
unmapped by Carruthers’ four models, which all presuppose
that an integrated, metarepresentational faculty is the key to
mindreading. Gallagher argues that most of our mindreading
abilities can be reduced to a weakly integrated swarm of first-
order mechanisms, including face recognition and an ability to
quickly map a facial expression to the appropriate emotional
response, a perceptual bias towards organic versus inorganic
movement, an automated capacity for imitation and propriocep-
tive sense of others’ movements (through the mirror neuron
system), an ability to track the gaze of others, and a bias
towards triadic gaze (I-you-target). Notably, autistic individuals
have deficiencies throughout the swarm.
Someone pushing a “metarepresentation was wholly exapted”
proposal might argue as follows: Interpretative propositional atti-
tude ascription is a very recent development, likely an exaptation
derived from linguistic abilities and general-purpose concept-
learning resources. Primate ancestors in social competition
almost never needed to think about others not within perceptual
range; in the absence of languagewhich could beused to raise ques-
tions and consider plans concerning spatially or temporally absent
individuals, there would have been little opportunity to
demonstrate third-person mindreading prowess. After developing
languages with metarepresentational resources, our ancestors’
endowment with the swarm would have left them well placed to
acquire metarepresentational mindreading and metacognition
through general learning. While such abilities were likely favored
by cultural evolution in comparatively recent history, it is not
clear that any further orders to genetic evolution needed to be
placed or filled. Evolutionary “just so” stories come cheap; if Car-
ruthers wants to make a strong case that the faculty evolved in
response to social pressures (instead of just excellence with the
swarm and/or other general aspects of cognition thought to be
required for Machiavellian Intelligence, such as attention, execu-
tive control, and working memory), he needs further argument.
Two issues must be overcome for the swarm proposal to be con-
sidered a serious alternative. First, the concurrent appearance of
success on verbal first- and third-person false-belief tasks must be
explained. Here, we point the reader to Chapter 9 of Stenning
and Van Lambalgen (2008), which makes a strong case that the
logic of both tasks requires a kind of conditional reasoning which
does not develop until around age 4 and is also affected by autism
(and see also Perner et al. [2007] for a related account). Second,
there is the work on implicit false-belief tasks with prelinguistic
infants (Onishi & Baillargeon 2005). These findings are both intri-
guing and perplexing (consider, for example, that the infants’
“implicit mastery” at 15 months is undetectable at 2.5 years), and
the empirical jury is still out as to whether the evidence of prefer-
ential looking towards the correct location can support the weight
of the metarepresentational conclusions which have been placed
on it (see Perner & Ruffman 2005; Ruffman & Perner 2005). The
infants’ preferential looking can be explained if they quickly learn
an actor-object-location binding and register novelty when the
agent looks elsewhere. More recent studies (e.g., Surian et al.
2007) claiming to rule out alternatives to the metarepresentational
explanation have produced findings that are ambiguous at best
(Perner et al. 2007).
One might concede that the mechanism generating the gaze
bias in infants is not itself metarepresentational, but nevertheless
hold that it evolved because it enabled its possessors to develop
metarepresentation – likely wielding a poverty of the stimulus
(PoS) argument to the effect that even with language, metarepre-
sentational mindreading does not come for free. We suggest that
such reasoning no longer carries the weight it once did. Recent
work on neural network modeling of the hippocampus, which
highlights its ability to quickly discover abstract, informationally
efficient bindings of stimulus patterns (especially when fed
neutral cues like words – e.g., see Gluck & Myers 2001; Gluck
et al. 2008) dulls the PoS sword. Finally, even if the PoS argu-
ment is accepted, there remains a huge leap to the conclusion
that the bias evolved because of its ability to bootstrap metarepre-
sentation – and not for something simpler.
In light of the swarm alternative, the usefulness of Carruthers’
distinction between “weak” and “genuine” forms of mindreading
and metacognition becomes questionable. Our overarching
worry is that Carruthers’ emphasis on a single faculty of metare-
presentation, combined with his acknowledgment of the rich
heritage of cognitive abilities shared between humans and
animals, leaves the faculty almost epiphenomenal in human cog-
nition (except, perhaps, for Machiavelli himself) – a position that
Carruthers has previously been driven to adopt with respect to
his account of phenomenal consciousness (Carruthers 2005;
see also Shriver & Allen 2005). An alternative approach might
be to tone down the deflationary invocation of first-order mech-
anisms, and focus instead on what creatures endowed with a
swarm of weakly integrated mechanisms can do and learn.
Once we abandon the assumption that mindreading is centra-
lized in a single metarepresentational faculty, we can investigate
whether something like Gallagher’s swarm could implement
various degrees of competence in reacting adaptively to the
mental states of others. This perspective focuses us on the flexi-
bility and adaptive significance of the evolved mechanisms which
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constitute the swarms, for a wide range of organisms in a variety
of social environments (including humans in theirs). These sug-
gestions are in the spirit of Dennett (1983), who advocated the
usefulness of metarepresentational hypotheses in devising new
experiments, accepting from the beginning that animals and
humans will “pass some higher-order tests and fail others”
(p. 349). Ultimately, we think that the questions Carruthers
raises about the relationship between self-regarding and other-
regarding capacities are interesting and should be pursued; and
they can be pursued without engaging in the line-drawing exer-
cise which de-emphasizes the significance of good comparative
work for understanding human cognition.
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Abstract: Fifty years or so after the cognitive revolution, some cognitive
accounts seem to be converging on treatments of how we come to know
about ourselves and others that have much in common with behavior
analytic accounts. Among the factors that keep the accounts separate is
that behavioral accounts take a much broader view of what counts as
behavior.
Roughly half a century has passed since the cognitive revolution
declared behaviorism dead and promised solutions to long-standing
problems of philosophy and psychology. Carruthers provides an
opportunity to assess the progress that has taken place. Mind
remains central in his account, and its hierarchical structure is
illustrated in the pivotal roles of metarepresentations and meta-
cognitions. In place of behavior and events in the world, the
action takes place in the dynamics of their surrogates, such as
perceptions and intentions and beliefs and concepts and atti-
tudes, none of which lend themselves to measurement in the
units of the physical or biological sciences. Most of the entities
in Carruthers’ account existed in the vocabularies of the mid-
1950s, though typically more closely anchored to their origins
in colloquial talk, which since then has sometimes been called
folk psychology.
What has most obviously changed are the linkages among the
mentalistic terms. Carruthers deals with the particular priorities
of mindreading and metacognition. Are they independent mech-
anisms or a single mechanism with two modes of access? Is one a
prerequisite for the other? Carruthers concludes that metacogni-
tion is grounded in mindreading. If one argues that judgments
about oneself must be distinguished from judgments about
others, his conclusion is sound. But this conclusion is one that
a variety of behaviorism reached long before the advent of the
cognitive revolution. In his “Behaviorism at 50,” Skinner (1963)
recounted the history of Watsonian methodological behaviorism
in the early decades of the twentieth century and its rejection of
introspection (see also Catania 1993), but he also noted the
unnecessary constraints that Watson’s account had imposed on
theory.
Skinner’s later radical behaviorism rejected the Watsonian
constraints and extended his approach to the origins of the
language of private events. As a contribution to a symposium
organized by his advisor, E. G. Boring, Skinner (1945) made
explicit his interest in “Boring from Within.” The 1945 paper,
“The Operational Analysis of Psychological Terms,” was a renun-
ciation of operationism, but, more important, it provided an
account of how a vocabulary of private events (feelings, emotions,
etc.) could be created even though those who taught the words
and maintained consistencies of usage had access only to
shared public accompaniments of those private events.1 Given
these origins of the private or introspective language, Skinner’s
resolution of the issue in terms of the public practices of the
verbal community is the only feasible way of dealing with the
problem that Carruthers has so aptly described in terms of his
mindreading system, which never has access to what others are
imagining or feeling. To the extent that it does have access to
what one feels or imagines oneself, one can speak of those
events only in a vocabulary that is anchored in public correlates.
Carruthers’ point that instances of self-attributed unsymbolized
thought occur in circumstances in which a third party might
have made the same attribution is perfectly consistent with this
argument.
The irony, then, is that with respect to introspection, judg-
ments about the behavior of others (mindreading) and judgments
about one’s own behavior (metacognition), Carruthers has
reached conclusions that are consistent with Skinner’s. One can
guess that he took so long only because of the complexity of
the terms that entered into his account. Skinner’s account is far
more parsimonious. Skinner does not begin with something
called discriminating and follow it with differential responding;
the differential responding is itself the discriminating. He does
not say that perceiving and sensing and thinking are something
different from behaving; they are kinds of behavior, defined
not by whether they involve movement but rather by whether
they are involved in contingent relations with environmental
events (for this reason, Carruthers notwithstanding, a lot of beha-
vior goes on even when one is sitting quiet and motionless, and
one has just as much access to this behavior as to that of standing
or walking). There is no more need to appeal to seeing and
hearing as prerequisite concepts than there is to say that we
cannot sit or stand or walk without concepts of sitting or standing
or walking; these are all names for things we do. To invoke them
as explanations does not serve our theories well.
Carruthers’ account also converges on other concepts that
have been elaborated by Skinner. For example, his System 1
and System 2 have features that are closely paralleled by what
Skinner (1969) respectively called rule-governed and contin-
gency-shaped behavior, and Carruthers is surely on the right
track in saying that speech is an action that does not begin with
metacognitive representations of thought (a more detailed
account is beyond the scope of this commentary, but see
Catania 2006, Chs. 14 and 15). Furthermore, in considering
the different environmental contingencies that operate on
verbal and nonverbal classes of behavior, the behavioral
account has no trouble dealing with the various confabulations
that Carruthers has surveyed. Just as speech errors can tell us a
lot about language structure, so confabulations may tell us a lot
about the nature of our judgments about ourselves and others.
It is good to see cognitive science at last converging on con-
clusions that had once been reached in behavioral accounts. If
that were the only point, this commentary would serve little
but a historical purpose. But there is extensive behavior analytic
research relevant to these issues (in particular, see Wixted &
Gaitan 2002), and some of it may prove useful to those of any
theoretical orientation. Of course, it would be not at all surprising
if the suggestions here are not well received. That likelihood is
enhanced by the fact that this has been a necessarily brief and
superficial presentation of the behavioral case. But the literature
is there, so perhaps a few will check it out.
NOTE
1. Two articles by B. F. Skinner cited in this commentary (Skinner
1945; 1969) were reprinted in Behavioral and Brain Sciences (Vol. 7,
December 1984).
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